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TERRITORIALITY AND TANGIBILITY AFTER TRANSOCEAN
Timothy R. Holbrook∗
ABSTRACT
Patent law is generally considered the most territorial form of intellectual
property. The extension of infringement to include “offers to sell” inventions
opened the door to potential extraterritorial expansion of U.S. patent law. In
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA,
Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit walked through the door
by concluding (1) that the location of the ultimate sale, not the location of the
offer, determines whether patent infringement occurred and (2) that there can
be infringement by selling or offering to sell an invention based solely on
diagrams and schematics. The one–two punch of these holdings works a
considerable expansion of the territorial scope of a U.S. patent and of these
infringement provisions generally. This Essay explores the consequences of
these holdings, making the following conclusions. First, the elimination of a
tangibility requirement for infringement, while ultimately correct, creates a
number of problems when coupled with the court’s holding on
extraterritoriality. Because the sale need not be consummated for there to be
an infringing offer to sell, the court extended infringement to circumstances
where no activity has taken place within the United States. Moreover, if this
standard is used to inform the scope of the on-sale bar to patentability, then
the court greatly expanded potential sources of prior art that could be used to
invalidate existing U.S. patents. Additionally, comparing Transocean to the
territoriality standards in trademark law demonstrates that the holding of
Transocean may not be as extensive as some of the language in the opinion
suggests if it is limited to offers made abroad by U.S. citizens or corporations.
Regardless of the citizenship factor, this comparative analysis also
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demonstrates that the Federal Circuit should take into account potential
conflicts with the law in foreign locations where the negotiations take place.
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INTRODUCTION
When Congress amended the Patent Act to include “offer[ing] to sell” an
invention as a form of direct infringement in 1994,1 it provided very little
guidance as to the meaning and scope of that provision.2 Courts3 and
commentators4 have bemoaned this dearth of guidance and have attempted to
fill the void.5 Nevertheless, two key, and seemingly unrelated, ambiguities
remained: (1) What was the extraterritorial reach of infringement by offering to
sell an invention, and (2) could there be an infringing offer in the absence of a
tangible embodiment of the invention?

1 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a)(1)(A), 108 Stat. 4809, 4988 (1994)
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006)).
2 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement for
Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of
Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 763 (2003).
3 See, e.g., 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Little
interpretation of this change as it relates to direct infringement under § 271(a) has been given . . . .”); Sitrick v.
Freehand Sys., Inc., No. 02 C 1568, 2002 WL 31443128, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2002) (“Federal Circuit case
law defining ‘offer to sell’ under § 271 is still developing . . . .”); Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs.,
Ltd., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“‘[O]ffer to sell’ has received relatively little interpretation
in the courts, and is not helpfully defined in the statute or in its legislative history.”); ESAB Grp., Inc. v.
Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 333 (D.S.C. 1999) (“There is scant case law available interpreting what
constitutes an ‘offer to sell’ as it appears in the amended form of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).”); see also Joan E.
Beckner, Note, Patent Infringement by Component Export: Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp. and the
Extraterritorial Effect of U.S. Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 803, 823 (2002) (“[T]he law surrounding an
‘offer to sell’ an invention without an actual or contemplated infringing sale remains unsettled.”).
4 See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, Commentary, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual
Property: Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 603, 608 (1997) (“Adding ‘offering for sale’ may have
interesting implications for the territorial scope of a U.S. patent, depending on how the phrase is
interpreted. . . . Is an offer by a person in another country to a customer in the United States an offer in the
United States even though the sale will be consummated or the product delivered outside the United States?”);
Edwin D. Garlepp, An Analysis of the Patentee’s New Exclusive Right to “Offer to Sell,” 81 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 315, 318–25 (1999); Holbrook, supra note 2, at 763; Timothy R. Holbrook,
Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering in the United States to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 723–26 (2004); Thomas L. Irving & Stacy D. Lewis, Proving a Date of Invention and
Infringement After GATT/TRIPS, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 309, 349–52 (1994); Scott A. Cromar, Note, Location of the
Contemplated Sale: The Ultimate Guide in “Offer to Sell” Transnational U.S. Patent Infringement, 2012 U.
ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 7–9, 28–32), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1765342;
Rex W. Miller, II, Note, Construing “Offers to Sell” Patent Infringement: Why Economic Interests Rather
than Territoriality Should Guide the Construction, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 407–09 (2009); Robert Ryan
Morishita, Note, Patent Infringement After GATT: What Is an Offer to Sell?, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 905, 908;
Larry S. Zelson, Comment, The Illusion of “Offer to Sell” Patent Infringement: When an Offer Is an Offer but
Is Not an Offer, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1283, 1300–01 (2006).
5 See infra notes 13–33 and accompanying text.
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These issues remained unresolved until Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.6 First, the Federal Circuit
finally resolved a split in the district courts over the extraterritorial reach of the
offer-to-sell provision, holding that an offer to sell is infringing if the offer’s
contemplated sale would occur in the United States, regardless of where the
actual offer was made.7 This approach, while offering considerable certainty,
allows U.S. patents to reach activities occurring exclusively outside of the
United States. Second, more subtly and perhaps more importantly, the Federal
Circuit concluded that an offer or a sale can infringe in the absence of a
physical embodiment of the invention.8 In other words, the court appears to be
permitting “paper” infringement under these provisions, which is not the norm
in patent law.
While the extraterritorial aspect of the holding has garnered attention,9 the
court’s reasoning regarding tangibility is also incredibly important. Indeed, the
one–two punch of the court’s conclusions has an unintended collateral
consequence: an immense expansion of the scope of this infringement
provision. In this Essay, I explore the development of the law by the court,
drawing on my earlier work in the area. The court’s decision in Transocean is
a considerable step in the development of the law of patent infringement.
When deconstructed, however, it does portend some potentially unintended
consequences, not only for this infringement provision but also for
infringement by selling an invention and for the on-sale bar to patentability of
35 U.S.C. § 102(b). In particular, it is now possible to find a party liable for
infringement even though no sale is ever concluded in the United States, so
long as the negotiations contemplate a future sale in the United States. The
6 617 F.3d 1296, 1309, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The district court more recently concluded that there was
no infringement or liability for the offer to sell the patented invention. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., No. H-07-2392, 2011 WL 2604769, at *5–7 (S.D. Tex. June 30,
2011).
7 See Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309.
8 See id. at 1310–11.
9 See, e.g., Melissa Y. Lerner, Note, You Can Run, but You Can’t Hide: The Expansion of Direct
Infringement and the Evisceration of Preventive Contracting in Maersk, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
207, 231–32 (2011); Susan Decker, Transocean Wins Ruling Reviving Patent-Infringement Lawsuit Against
Maersk, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2010, 1:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-18/transoceanwins-ruling-reviving-patent-infringement-lawsuit-against-maersk.html; Jason Rantanen, Transocean v.
Maersk: Speeding Up Deepsea Drilling, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
2010/08/transocean-v-maersk-speeding-up-deepsea-drilling.html?cid=6a00d8341c588553ef013486556c46
970c; Jimmie K. Tolliver, Offer to Sell in Another Country May Infringe a Patented Invention Under 35
U.S.C. § 271, CHI. IP BLOG (Aug. 25, 2010), http://chicagoipblog.com/2010/08/25/offer-to-sell-outside-of-theunited-states-may-infringe-a-patented-invention-under-35-u-s-c-%C2%A7271/.
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threat of a sale in the United States is sufficient alone, absent any actual
transaction being completed. While I agree with the court’s tangibility holding,
I ultimately fault the court’s conclusion regarding the extraterritorial reach of
the provision because it fails to account for issues of comity and conflicts of
law. Relatedly, given the oft-explored parallels between infringement for
offering to sell an invention and invalidity for placing an invention on sale, the
court may have ushered in a considerable expansion of prior art that could be
used to invalidate patents.
This Essay posits potential ways for the courts to grapple with
Transocean’s considerable expansion of patent law infringement. First,
drawing an analogy to trademark law, I argue that the extraterritorial holding
could be limited based on the citizenship of the parties at issue as well as the
impact on U.S. commerce. Second, the courts could look to the law of the
jurisdiction where the various negotiations took place to assess whether there is
a potential conflict in finding liability for the infringement of a U.S. patent.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR INFRINGING OFFERS TO
SELL A PATENTED INVENTION
Infringement for merely offering to sell an invention is a relatively new
development in U.S. patent law. The law was clear that the threat of a sale
alone did not constitute an infringing act; only completed sales ran afoul of the
patentee’s exclusive rights. This state of the law changed when Congress
amended § 271(a) to add, inter alia, “offers to sell” an invention within the
United States as a form of infringement10 in order to implement the
requirements of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS).11 The provision’s legislative history unfortunately
offers no guidance as to what constitutes an infringing offer, leaving the
development to the courts.12 Although the language has been part of the U.S.
patent statute for over fifteen years now, the Federal Circuit has only recently
10 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a)(1)(A), 108 Stat. 4809, 4988 (1994)
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006)).
11 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 28(1)(a), Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. TRIPS was
part of the broader agreements in the Uruguay Round of negotiations that resulted in converting the GATT
system to the World Trade Organization (WTO). See Miller, supra note 4, at 407–08. Congress modified U.S.
patent law in other ways as well, including adding importation as an exclusive right under § 271(a) and adding
“offer[ing] to sell” the invention as a form of contributory infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). See
Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 533(a)(1)(B)–(2); see also Holbrook, supra note 4, at 719, 722.
12 Holbrook, supra note 2, at 763.
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elaborated the standards for the provision. Transocean represents the most
significant development in this area.
A. The State of the Law Before Transocean13
Prior to Transocean, the Federal Circuit had few occasions to address the
scope of this relatively new form of infringement. The earliest cases were not
on the merits but instead addressed issues of personal jurisdiction: patentees
relied upon commercialization efforts in a given state to support personal
jurisdiction over the accused infringer.14 In these cases, the Federal Circuit
offered some clarification as to this provision. For example, the court held that
offers to sell are governed by federal common law, not state contract law,15 and
that offers to donate do not constitute infringing offers to sell.16 None of these
decisions offered a definition of what does constitute an infringing offer to sell.
Subsequently, the court in Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.17
partially answered that question. In Rotec, the court held that, to be an act of
infringement, an offer to sell must be a formal commercial offer “according to
the norms of traditional contractual analysis”18 and that the analysis is
informed by traditional sources of authority, such as the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.19 Thus, mere advertisements,
as invitations for offers to buy a product, would not trigger liability.20 Many of
the decisions regarding whether there has been an infringing offer to sell have
turned on this particular issue.21 The analyses tend to be very fact specific,
given the broad nature of the inquiry.22
13 This summary is somewhat succinct. More thorough and robust explorations of the common law
development of infringing offers to sell can be found in Holbrook, supra note 2, at 765–70; Holbrook, supra
note 4, at 723–26; and Cromar, supra note 4 (manuscript at 9–27).
14 HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304, 1308–10 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech
Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378–81 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
15 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379.
16 HollyAnne Corp., 199 F.3d at 1308–09.
17 215 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
18 Id. at 1254–55.
19 Id. at 1255, 1257 & n.5.
20 Id. at 1257.
21 See, e.g., Grp. One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047–48 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(considering the U.C.C. and treatises such as Corbin on Contracts, The Law of Contracts, and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts to inform the commercial-offer inquiry).
22 See, e.g., Fellowes, Inc. v. Michilin Prosperity Co., 491 F. Supp. 2d 571, 577–83 (E.D. Va. 2007)
(describing the actions of a manufacturer and importer as related to communicating with retailers, arranging
vendor agreements, and participating in vendor events, for the purpose of selling and offering to sell specific
patented models of paper shredders); Moldflow Corp. v. Simcon, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40–45 (D. Mass.
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Later cases by the Federal Circuit and district courts have put some flesh
onto the offer-to-sell standard. For example, the courts have made clear that
infringement by offering to sell a patented method will rarely, if ever, be
cognizable.23 The courts have also elaborated on the impact of the new
standard on intervening rights,24 which protects third parties if the scope of a
patent is changed during reissue.25 Specifically, the Federal Circuit has held
that, for absolute intervening rights to apply under the statute, the infringing
good must have been manufactured prior to the reissue date and that, thus, “the
‘offer to sell’ language . . . has not changed the statutory requirement that
absolute intervening rights apply only to existing products.”26
B. Lingering Ambiguities: The Extraterritorial Reach of “Offer[ing] to Sell”
and the Requirement for a Tangible Infringing Device
The introduction of infringement for merely offering to sell the invention
added an additional wrinkle: What are the territorial limits on such an act of
infringement? Would there be infringement if the offer was made in the United
States but the sale was overseas? Must both the offer and the contemplated sale
be within the United States? Over the years, a clear split developed in the
district courts, with some requiring both the offer and sale to be in the United
2003) (analyzing the specific contacts defendant had with a state to determine whether she could be subject to
general or specific jurisdiction).
23 See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding
that an offer to sell a machine capable of performing a claimed method is not infringement); Mirror Worlds,
LLC v. Apple, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 703, 725 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (“[A] sale or offer for sale is insufficient to
prove direct infringement of a method claim—sale of the apparatus is not the sale of the method—and thereby
irrelevant in calculating liability for direct infringement.”). Indeed, the Federal Circuit in NTP, Inc. v. Research
in Motion, Ltd. suggested, but did not hold, that it would be impossible to infringe a method claim by offering
to sell or selling the method. See 418 F.3d 1282, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he legislative history of
section 271(a) indicates Congress’s understanding that method claims could only be directly infringed by
use. . . . We need not and do not hold that method claims may not be infringed under the ‘sells’ and ‘offers to
sell’ prongs of section 271(a).”). This line of cases creates a significant asymmetry with the on-sale bar, by
which a pre-critical-date commercial agreement to perform a patented method can invalidate the patent claim.
See, e.g., Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, LLC, 269 F.3d 1321, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
24 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2006). Seemingly, such behavior, if performed by a third party, would not be
infringing conduct, even though it would serve to invalidate the patent if before the critical date. The court has
offered no explanation as to this disparate treatment of seemingly identical behavior.
25 Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1359–61 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For a general discussion of
intervening rights, see Holbrook, supra note 2, at 768–70. The Federal Circuit recently held en banc that
intervening rights after reexamination are triggered only by claim amendments or by the addition of new
claims; adoption of a narrowing claim construction is insufficient. Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon,
Inc., No. 2010-1548, 2012 WL 858700, at *8–9 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2012) (en banc).
26 Shockley, 248 F.3d at 1353. But cf. infra notes 53–58 and accompanying text (explaining how the
Federal Circuit permits infringement by selling or offering to sell an invention absent a physical embodiment).
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States,27 and others limiting the territoriality requirement to the offer only, not
the contemplated sale.28
The Federal Circuit itself passed on resolving the issue a number of times.
The issue was presented in the Rotec case, yet the court did not resolve the
question because it concluded there was no offer to sell, regardless of where
the offer took place.29 Judge Newman, in contrast, would have decided the case
on the territorial basis. In her view, to infringe, both the offer and the
contemplated sale would have to take place within the United States.30 The
Federal Circuit took a similar approach in MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v.
Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., again avoiding the territoriality issue by
concluding there was simply no commercial offer to sell.31 The state of the law
remained unsettled32 until the Federal Circuit’s decision in Transocean
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.33
II. TRANSOCEAN: EXPANDING THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF U.S.
PATENTS AND ELIMINATING THE NEED FOR A TANGIBLE INFRINGING DEVICE
Before the decision in this case, Transocean was more famous, or perhaps
notorious, for its rig involved in the Gulf of Mexico explosion and resulting oil
spill.34 In Transocean, the Federal Circuit confronted head-on the split that had
27 See, e.g., Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1084,
1110–11 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Wing Shing Prods. (BVI), Ltd. v. Simatelex Manufactory Co., 479 F. Supp. 2d
388, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs., Ltd., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1170–71
(C.D. Cal. 2001); SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 336, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d,
594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060
(2011); Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube Holdings Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614–25 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
28 See, e.g., Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 228, 233–34 (D. Del. 2003);
FieldTurf, Inc. v. Sw. Recreational Indus., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 708, 731–32 (E.D. Ky. 2002), vacated in part
on standing grounds, 357 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
29 215 F.3d 1246, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
30 Id. at 1258–60 (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment).
31 420 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The court did seem to suggest that the offer would need to be in
the United States, however. See id. (“MEMC points to no evidence of negotiations occurring in the United
States between SUMCO and Samsung Austin.”). Under the holding of Transocean, such a consideration
would be irrelevant. See infra notes 70–79 and accompanying text.
32 See SEB S.A., 594 F.3d at 1375 (“This court has yet to define the full territorial scope of the ‘offers to
sell’ offense in § 271(a).”); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1110–11 (“In light of the fact
that the parties . . . rely on District Court opinions for support of their respective positions, it would appear that
the issue is unsettled.”).
33 617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
34 See Braden Reddall, Transocean Talking with BP over Gulf Oil Spill, INS. J. (May 25, 2011), http://
www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2011/05/25/199887.htm. The rig covered by the patent at issue
in Transocean differed from the one involved in the Gulf accident.
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developed among the district courts regarding the extraterritorial application of
the offer-to-sell infringement provision, and this time it did not (and, indeed,
could not) dodge the issue as it did in Rotec and MEMC. Unlike those cases,
where there was a factual dispute as to whether an infringing offer had been
made regardless of its territorial location, here there was no dispute on appeal
that an offer had been made outside of the United States, although the
contemplated sale would take place within the United States.35
Specifically, Transocean’s patents related to an apparatus for offshore
drilling.36 Although they were aware of the patents, Maersk A/S (a Danish
company) contracted with Keppel FELS, Ltd. to build an arguably infringing
rig in Singapore.37 Maersk A/S then negotiated with Statoil ASA (a Norwegian
company) for Statoil’s use of the rig.38 The companies reached an agreement,
and Maersk USA, the American subsidiary of Maersk A/S, and Statoil Gulf of
Mexico, LLC, a Texas corporation, signed a contract in Norway designating
that the rig would be used in the Gulf of Mexico but affording Statoil the right
to use the rig outside of that area contingent on certain restrictions.39 Maersk
USA was aware of Transocean’s patents and expressly reserved the right in the
contract to alter the design “in view of court or administrative determinations
throughout the world.”40 In light of Transocean’s successful assertion of the
patents against a different company, Maersk USA altered the design to comply
with the injunction in that case to sell something that, after the modification,
did not infringe.41
The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement by
relying “on the undisputed facts that the negotiation and signing of the contract
took place outside the [United States] and that the contract gave Maersk the
option to alter the rig to avoid infringement.”42 Thus, because the record
demonstrated both an offer and actual sale, the Federal Circuit confronted the
territoriality issue squarely.43 More subtly, and perhaps more importantly, the

35 See Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1308 (“There is no dispute that there was an offer to sell in this case, but
Maersk USA argues that the offer was made in Norway, not the United States, thereby absolving it of § 271(a)
liability.”).
36 Id. at 1300–01.
37 Id. at 1307.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. (quoting the contract between Transocean and Maersk) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1308.
43 Id. at 1308–10.
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court also confronted an interesting dynamic: as of the time the offer was made
and accepted, no rig had actually been built.44 Indeed, the rig that ultimately
was delivered had been altered in accordance with the injunction in the other
litigation in a manner that was noninfringing.45 As a result, the court was faced
with a unique question: Could there be an infringing sale or offer to sell based
strictly on the design and absent a tangible object?46 In other words, could
there be “paper” infringement?
A. (Apparent) Resolution of the Extraterritoriality Issue
The district courts had split on the territoriality issue, but the disagreement
involved whether an offer made in the United States would be infringing if the
sale contemplated was outside of the United States.47 All of the previous cases
assumed that the offer itself would need to be made within the United States.48
Rotec and MEMC seemed to operate under that assumption, even though the
Federal Circuit refused to answer the question in both cases. In Transocean,
however, the court rejected that assumption and worked a considerable change
in the extraterritorial reach of infringement by offering to sell a patented item.
The Federal Circuit rejected the argument that at least the offer had to be in
the United States, viewing it as inconsistent with the statutory language and
contrary to public policy:
The statute precludes “offers to sell . . . within the United
States.” To adopt Maersk USA’s position would have us read the
statute as “offers made within the United States to sell” or “offers
made within the United States to sell within the United States.” First,
this is not the statutory language. Second, this interpretation would
exalt form over substance by allowing a U.S. company to travel
abroad to make offers to sell back into the U.S. without any liability
for infringement. This company would generate interest in its product
in the U.S. to the detriment of the U.S. patent owner, the type of harm

44

Id. at 1310.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to the modified rig,
holding that Transocean was collaterally estopped from asserting infringement over it. Id. at 1312.
46 See id. at 1311–12.
47 See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
48 See, e.g., SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 336, 341 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d,
594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060
(2011).
45
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that offer to sell within the U.S. liability is meant to remedy. These
49
acts create a real harm in the U.S. to a U.S. patentee.

Therefore, instead of quibbling over whether the offer had taken place in the
United States, the court found the location of the contemplated sale
determinative. Thus, an offer made anywhere in the world that contemplates a
sale in the United States could be an infringing offer to sell. The court
recognized the extraterritorial reach of its holding and even acknowledged that
the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws suggests a
narrower construction of the statute.50 But the court dismissed this concern.51
Thus, the court reversed the district court’s summary judgment of no
infringement and remanded the case to consider whether the rig in the offer
actually infringed the patents at issue.52
B. Intangibility: Allowing for “Paper” Infringement by Selling or Offering to
Sell the Invention
It is the latter aspect of the court’s holding that, while not garnering the
attention of the patent world as much, has potentially far-sweeping
implications. The court specifically instructed the district court to “determine
what was offered for sale, not what was ultimately delivered.”53 In analyzing
whether there had been an infringing sale of the invention, the court reached
the same conclusion regarding the territoriality issue.54 More importantly, the
court found that the proper basis for assessing infringement was not the rig
actually delivered, but instead the rig that was the subject of the original
agreement.55
Maersk specifically argued that there could not be an infringing sale under
§ 271(a) “because the rig was not complete at the time of contracting.”56 In
Maersk’s view, “for there to have been a sale within the meaning of 35 U.S.C.

49 Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
(2006)).
50 Id.
51 See id.
52 Id. at 1313.
53 Id. at 1310 n.4 (citing Holbrook, supra note 2, at 753).
54 Id. at 1310.
55 Id. at 1311.
56 Id. at 1310.
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§ 271(a), the entire apparatus must have been constructed and ready for use.”57
The court rejected Maersk’s argument, reasoning:
Maersk USA and Statoil signed a contract and the schematics that
accompanied that contract could support a finding that the sale was
of an infringing article under § 271(a). The fact that Maersk USA,
after the execution of the contract, altered the rig in response to the
GSF injunction is irrelevant to this infringement analysis. The
potentially infringing article is the rig sold in the contract, not the
altered rig that Maersk USA delivered to the U.S.
Finally, we reject Maersk USA’s claim that the entire apparatus
must have been constructed and ready for use in order to have been
sold. . . . A “sale” is not limited to the transfer of tangible property; a
sale may also be the agreement by which such a transfer takes place.
In this case, there was a contract to sell a rig that included
schematics. . . . Transocean argues that these schematics show sale of
the patented invention. This is a genuine issue of material fact
58
sufficient to withstand summary judgment.

The court therefore concluded that it is possible to infringe a patent by selling
or offering to sell an invention without ever having constructed the infringing
device.59 Under this reasoning, a party could infringe a patent based on mere
schematics or designs without ever constructing an infringing device, so long
as there was an offer to sell or a sale of the unconstructed device.60
III. IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSOCEAN: CONSIDERABLE EXPANSION OF
COMMERCIALLY BASED INFRINGEMENT
Both of Transocean’s holdings regarding the territorial reach of offers to
sell (and sales) and the possibility for intangible infringement deserve further
consideration. Individually, neither holding may seem terribly significant;
together, however, they portend a significant expansion of the scope of patent
57 Id. (quoting Brief of Defendant–Appellee Maersk Contractors USA, Inc. at 60, Transocean, 617 F.3d
1296 (No. 2009-1556)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
58 Id. at 1311 (citation omitted).
59 Id.
60 On remand, the district court found no infringement. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling Inc.
v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., No. H-07-2392, 2011 WL 2604769, at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 30, 2011). The
court concluded, inter alia, that “[a]n offer to enter into a contract that includes language that avoids
infringement cannot constitute an infringing act.” Id. at *6. Moreover, assuming there was infringement, there
was no evidence of price erosion, and the grant of a reasonable royalty could be unconscionable because the
harm was de minimis. Id. (citing Holbrook, supra note 2, at 789–92). The district court’s conclusions do not
alter the importance of the Federal Circuit’s decision in the case, and it is not clear that the district court’s
judgment is entirely consistent with the Federal Circuit’s decision.
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infringement. This Part deconstructs the court’s analysis for both holdings. As
to the extraterritoriality issue, this Part analyzes the various possible
permutations of the holding and concludes that the extraterritorial reach
afforded by the decision is highly problematic. As to the tangibility issue, this
Part argues that, while the holding is correct—there should be infringement
based on sales or offers to sell in the absence of a manufactured good—it is
troubling when coupled with the court’s conclusion on extraterritoriality.
Intangibility now creates a broad swath of potentially infringing behavior
outside of the United States. Moreover, as yet unrecognized by the courts or
the literature, the combination of the two holdings augurs a potential sweeping
expansion of information that could be used to invalidate U.S. patents pursuant
to the on-sale bar to patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
A. Deconstructing and Evaluating the Extraterritorial Reach of Infringing
Offers to Sell
The norm for U.S. law is that it does not apply extraterritorially61 absent a
clear signal from Congress.62 This presumption is rooted in a variety of
considerations, including potential conflict with another nation’s law,
international comity, choice-of-law concerns, congressional intent, and
separation of powers.63 Although the courts have inconsistently applied the
presumption,64 it appeared to have particular salience in the context of patent
law, arguably the most territorially rooted form of intellectual property.65

61 One interesting case has explored exactly what is the territory of the United States, in part to determine
whether U.S. law should apply to the allegedly infringing acts. See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical
Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d 342, 364–72 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (addressing the issue of “whether the seas located
approximately 100 miles away from Alaska can be considered ‘territory’ of the United States for purposes of
patent law”); accord Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856) (discussing infringement on vessels
temporarily in U.S. ports). See generally J. Jonas Anderson, Hiding Behind Nationality: The Temporary
Presence Exception and Patent Infringement Avoidance, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2008)
(discussing the history, purpose, and application of the temporary-presence exception); Ted L. Field, The
“Planes, Trains, and Automobiles” Defense to Infringement for Today’s Global Economy: Section 272 of the
Patent Act, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26 (2006) (same).
62 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455–56 (2007); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. Usi Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
63 Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L.
505, 513–17 (1997).
64 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878–80 (noting disregard of the presumption in the context of securities
regulation); Holbrook, supra note 4, at 729–31.
65 Chisum, supra note 4, at 605.
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In considering the extraterritoriality of offers to sell, the following table
breaks down the various permutations. It recognizes that there are two
elements to this form of infringement: the location of the offer and the location
of the ultimate sale. The locations of the offers can be limited to those in the
United States and those anywhere, as can the location of the contemplated
sales. Considering the two elements results in the following two-by-two
matrix:

Sale Must Be in United
States

Sale May Be Outside
United States

Offer Must Be in
United States

Offer & sale in United
States

Offer in, sale outside
United States

Offer May Be
Outside United
States

Offer outside,
sale in United States

Offer & sale outside
United States

The upper-left quadrant, “Offer & sale in United States,” undisputedly is
covered by § 271(a)’s proscription on offering to sell the invention. Both
acts—the offer and the contemplated sale—are within the United States.66
Such activity would not run afoul of extraterritorial concerns. The light-gray
shading indicates that this quadrant undisputedly falls within the scope of
§ 271(a).
Also uncontroversial is the conclusion that the bottom-right quadrant—
offers made outside of the United States to sell a device outside of the United
States—would not infringe. Indeed, to hold that there could be infringement in
that context would be an extreme expansion of the extraterritorial scope of a
U.S. patent because infringement liability would be untethered to anything
occurring in the United States. Precluding infringement for this quadrant is an

66 See, e.g., Synaptic Pharm. Corp. v. MDS Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452, 463 (D.N.J. 2002)
(“Given the fact that MDS offers to sell the allegedly infringing assays in the United States and that these sales
are consummated in the United States, the Court finds that there is insufficient grounds upon which to grant
summary judgment at this time with regard to violations of § 271(a).”).
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application of the classic approach to territoriality.67 One possible exception
could be if courts applied a pure effects-based test—that somehow these
external events had some impact on U.S. markets.68 The courts, so far, have
not applied such an expansive effects-based test in patent law.69
Prior to Transocean, the courts generally assumed that at least the offer had
to be made within the United States. The district courts were split between the
top two quadrants and disagreed as to whether the contemplated sale
necessarily had to be in the United States to infringe.70 All of the cases
assumed that at least the offer had to be made in the United States.71
Even the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Rotec and MEMC took as a given
that the offer needed to be in the United States. In Rotec, both the majority and
the concurrence assumed the offer had to take place within the United States.
The majority’s analysis focused on domestic activities, and the court framed
the issue as follows:
There is no genuine dispute that at least some of Defendants’
activities before signing the agreement with TGDPC took place in the
United States. At the same time, it is also undisputed that many of
these activities took place outside the United States, in China and
elsewhere. These extraterritorial activities however, are irrelevant to
the case before us, because “[t]he right conferred by a patent under
our law is confined to the United States and its territories, and
infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in
a foreign country.” Thus, we must establish whether Defendants’
activities in the United States, as would be construed by a reasonable

67 See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 85, 88 (1998) (explaining the “traditional view” that U.S. law should apply only to conduct within the
United States, regardless of the location of any resulting effects).
68 See id. at 124 (advocating the Borkian view that the effect of the act, not its location, should determine
whether acts are extraterritorial); see also Miller, supra note 4.
69 See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2119, 2154–62 (2008) (discussing the pros and cons of effects-based tests).
70 See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 733–35, 739–41; supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
71 See, e.g., Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs., Ltd., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1171 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (“[A]n ‘offer to sell’ made within the United States that contemplates a ‘sale’ of goods outside of the
United States is not within the permissible scope of liability for 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). No direct infringement can
be found solely premised on an ‘offer to sell’ within the United States, unless the sale that is contemplated by
the ‘offer’ is or will also be consummated within the United States.”).
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jury, are sufficient to establish an “offer for sale,” as that phrase is
72
used in § 271(a).

This characterization of the facts would be inapposite, and even incorrect, if
the court had contemplated using the later-articulated Transocean standard.
Acts in China could be relevant if they constituted an offer that contemplates a
sale within the United States. Moreover, the focus on the negotiation activities
within the United States would be irrelevant if the sale were to be in China.73
Even Judge Newman’s concurrence notes that she believed the offer itself had
to be made in the United States; indeed, she relied on a comparative analysis of
United Kingdom law that noted that “‘offers to dispose of’ the patented
product ‘must be read as meaning, “offers in the United Kingdom to dispose of
the product in the United Kingdom.”’”74 Judge Newman’s analysis clearly
contemplated that both the offer and the contemplated sale would need to be in
the United States.
Similarly, in MEMC, the court reasoned that “MEMC point[ed] to no
evidence of negotiations occurring in the United States between SUMCO and
Samsung Austin. At the same time, transmittal of e-mails containing technical
data from SUMCO to Samsung Austin c[ould not] constitute an ‘offer for
sale.’”75 Under the Transocean rule, there would be no need to consider the
evidence of the location of the negotiations because the location would be
irrelevant. Contrary to Transocean’s assertion that MEMC was “even further
attenuated [than Rotec] as it did not even consider location of the offer or the
contemplated sale,”76 MEMC suggests that the court believed that an offer
within the United States was a necessary condition, regardless of the location
of the sale.
In essence, none of the courts that confronted this issue had ever considered
the lower-left quadrant, “Offer outside, sale in United States,” within the
territorial scope of the offer-to-sell provision. After Transocean, the two left
quadrants (enclosed by the double line) constitute infringement. Transocean’s
72 Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (alteration in original)
(emphases added) (citation omitted) (quoting Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641,
650 (1915)).
73 See id. at 1249 (delineating all of the activities that took place within the United States).
74 Id. at 1259 (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Kalman v. PCL Packaging (U.K.) Ltd.,
[1982] F.S.R. 406 (Pat) at 418 (Eng.)).
75 MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
76 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1310
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
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rule, while apparent from considering the above matrix, was never explicitly
considered by earlier courts. By choosing this rule, the court seems to have
embraced the Borkian view of extraterritoriality described by Professor
William S. Dodge: acts of Congress apply only to activities where the effect is
inside, regardless of the locus of the activity.77 In essence, the Transocean rule
is a form of an effects-based test, where the exercise of U.S. law is justified
because the act—the offer—will have effects within the United States.78
Technically, there is no reason why infringement for offering to sell
necessarily should be limited to those two quadrants. It is conceivable that all
three quadrants could fall within the scope of the offer-to-sell provision, i.e.,
that offers in the United States to sell in the United States, offers outside of the
United States to sell in the United States, and offers in the United States to sell
outside of the United States, could all fall within the scope of § 271(a). In other
words, the facts of Transocean did not present the situation where negotiations
took place in the United States over a foreign sale, as was arguably the
situation in Rotec and MEMC. The traditional territorial rule is that Congress
can clearly regulate activity that occurs within the United States;79 thus,
regulation of such domestic negotiations would be within congressional power.
Therefore, it is conceivable that, even post-Transocean, making an offer within
the United States to sell outside the United States would be an act of
infringement.80 This interpretation would expand the scope of this provision
beyond its already-considerable reach.
The language of Transocean is, of course, inconsistent with that
interpretation because the court expressly noted that “[t]he focus should not be
on the location of the offer, but rather the location of the future sale that would
occur pursuant to the offer,” and indeed, “the location of the contemplated sale
controls whether there is an offer to sell within the United States.”81

77

See Dodge, supra note 67, at 88.
See Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309 (“These acts create a real harm in the U.S. to a U.S. patentee.”). See
generally Holbrook, supra note 69, at 2154–57 (discussing various effects-based tests).
79 See Dodge, supra note 67, at 88.
80 See ION, Inc. v. Sercel, Inc., No. 5:06-CV-236-DF, 2010 WL 3768110, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 16,
2010) (“In this case, it is undisputed that the devices implicated by Sercel’s motion were manufactured, sold,
and delivered abroad while the offers for those devices were made in the U.S. . . . Thus, unlike Transocean,
where the Court answered the question regarding foreign offers for domestic sales, the question here is
whether domestic offers for foreign sales fall within the scope of U.S. patent protection.”).
81 Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309 (emphasis added).
78
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Consequently, two district courts have expressly held that an offer within the
United States to sell an invention abroad is not an act of infringement.82
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit, in a post-Transocean decision,
recognized the ambiguity surrounding whether domestic offers to sell abroad
could nevertheless still be infringing. In August Technology Corp. v. Camtek,
Ltd., the court, in rather cursory form, addressed the scope of the injunction
granted in the case.83 The district court’s injunction precluded the infringer
“from communicating with third parties in the United States for the purpose of
offering to sell accused devices for use outside the United States.”84 Because
the judgment was vacated and remanded on other grounds, the court did not
reach the issue of the scope of the injunction.85 The court noted, however:
We have no opinion at this time regarding the effect of Transocean
on the now-vacated injunction. Should the trial court find that
Camtek and its Falcon inspection machine infringe under our claim
construction, however, it should take into account the effect, if any,
86
Transocean has when crafting an appropriate injunction.

The import of this language could be that the Federal Circuit thinks that
enjoining domestic communications for foreign sales is not appropriate. Yet
the court expressly leaves the question open, demonstrating that Transocean
may not preclude infringement when an offer is made in the United States to
sell a device abroad.
The court in Transocean, therefore, took a somewhat unexpected path in
resolving the territoriality issue. While not offering the broadest possible
interpretation—one that would ensnare all three quadrants—its holding went
well beyond what prior courts considered by eliminating any need for the offer
to be made within the United States.

82 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Eng’g, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1208 (D. Nev. 2011) (“Although Halo
has provided evidence indicating that pricing discussions took place between Pulse and its customers in the
United States, Pulse has provided evidence that the majority of its accused products were manufactured and
shipped outside of the United States.”); ION, 2010 WL 3768110, at *4 (“Sercel’s domestic offers to
PDVSA/Bariven; Fundacao Euclides de Cunha in Brazil; and Mitcham Industries in 2008 and 2009 in Canada
fall outside the scope of the patent laws as a matter of law.”).
83 655 F.3d 1278, 1290–91 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
84 Id. at 1290.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1290–91 (emphasis added).

HOLBROOK GALLEYS3

1106

8/9/2012 11:00 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1087

B. Reconsidering the “Invention”: Intangible Infringement by Selling and
Offering to Sell the Patented Invention
Although the territoriality holding of the Transocean decision has garnered
attention,87 perhaps the more striking aspect of the decision is that it opens the
door for infringement by offering to sell or selling a patented invention based
on documents alone and without a physical embodiment of the invention.88 I
have previously proposed, and argued for, this approach,89 and the Federal
Circuit seems to have agreed.90
Of course, I agree with the court’s conclusion, and indeed, it is consistent
with viewing infringement of a patent through sales or offers to sell as an
appropriation of the economic value of the invention, as opposed to its physical
incarnation.91 Such economic appropriation is sharply different from
infringement by making, using, or importing the claimed invention, which
contemplates a physical appropriation of the invention.92 Such physical
appropriations may have economic consequences, such as foregone sales by
the patentee;93 the focus, though, is on the physical instantiation of the
invention. Nevertheless, two questions remain: Did the Federal Circuit have
authority to reach this conclusion, and if so, what should be the basis of
comparison with the patent to determine infringement? The following
subsections address these issues.
1. Is Transocean Contrary to Supreme Court Precedent?
The Federal Circuit’s move here is somewhat controversial. The holding
regarding tangibility is arguably inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
87 See, e.g., Thomas Carey, When Does an “Offer for Sale” Made in Another Country Result in
Infringement of a U.S. Patent?, SUNSTEIN INTELL. PROP. UPDATE (Aug. 2010), http://www.sunsteinlaw.com/
publications-news/news-letters/2010/08/Carey_201008.html.
88 See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. But see Lerner, supra note 9, at 217–19 (analyzing
common law contracts to argue that there must be “a thing capable of being transferred” for there to be a sale).
89 See Holbrook, supra note 2, at 805–13.
90 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1310
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he district court . . . never reached the factual issue of whether the subject of the offer
to sell was of a ‘patented invention’ by analyzing the design of the rig. Of course, in this analysis, the district
court must determine what was offered for sale, not what was ultimately delivered.” (citing Holbrook, supra
note 2, at 753)).
91 See Holbrook, supra note 2, at 805–13.
92 Id. at 813–15.
93 See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008) (discussing how uses of inventions are different than the typical economic
rationale).
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decision in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.94 The Court in Deepsouth
concluded there was no infringement under the then-patent laws95 when the
accused infringer had only manufactured the components of the patented
device without assembling them within the United States; instead, the
components were sent abroad and assembled there.96 Although seemingly
facing a question of whether the invention had been made within the United
States, the Supreme Court conflated “making” with “selling”: “The sales
question thus resolves itself into the question of manufacture: did Deepsouth
‘make’ (and then sell) something cognizable under the patent law as the
patented invention, or did it ‘make’ (and then sell) something that fell short of
infringement?”97 The Court thus seems to suggest that infringing sales are tied
to the manufacture of the good, not merely to the sale.
Transocean is arguably inconsistent with this view. In Deepsouth, all of the
components were manufactured, just not assembled.98 To manufacture such a
device, the infringer likely would have had design schematics or
manufacturing instructions of the deveining device that would demonstrate that
the good had been sold, even in the absence of the fully manufactured product.
Nevertheless, the Court found no infringement.99
A rather glib way of avoiding this language in Deepsouth is to simply note
that infringement by offering to sell an invention was added after Deepsouth,
so the decision is not controlling. One could argue that implicitly Congress
expanded the scope of § 271(a) or even silently overruled Deepsouth to allow
infringing sales for inchoate devices. That is too easy of an answer, however.
With respect to the territoriality question, Transocean is facially consistent
with Deepsouth. The sale in Deepsouth would have been outside the United
States;100 thus, Deepsouth does not apply to the situation in Transocean. But
that reconciliation ignores the above language in Deepsouth.

94 406 U.S. 518 (1972), superseded in part by statute, Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-622, 98 Stat. 3383.
95 Congress adopted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to overrule Deepsouth to a certain extent, but other aspects of the
decision remain binding precedent. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1253 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“[A]s to claims brought under § 271(a), Deepsouth remains good law: one may not be held liable
under § 271(a) for ‘making’ or ‘selling’ less than a complete invention.”).
96 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 523–28.
97 Id. at 527. But see Holbrook, supra note 2, at 806–07 (criticizing Deepsouth on this ground).
98 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 524.
99 Id. at 529.
100 See id. at 524.
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The stronger argument is that the Supreme Court did not truly confront
purely intangible infringement through sales. Instead, it was focused on the
actual manufacture of the components that were then sent overseas. The Court
did not address what would have happened if the device ultimately assembled
had been sold in the United States pursuant to a contract before any of the parts
were assembled. The tangibility issue simply was not before the Court.
The Supreme Court itself, in a different context, recognized that there can
be an “invention” before something is actually physically constructed. In Pfaff
v. Wells Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed whether an invention
had to be physically complete to trigger the on-sale bar to patentability found
in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).101 This provision precludes a patent if the invention was
“on sale in this country” more than one year before the date of the patent
application.102 In Pfaff, the inventor had never built the invention prior to
offering to sell it; the sale was based solely on engineering diagrams.103
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded that the invention could be on sale
even without a physical embodiment, so long as the invention was “ready for
patenting.”104 The Court recognized that the key to “invention” is the idea, not
the physical embodiment of the idea.105 An invention, therefore, can be
complete and on sale prior to being physically built.106 The reasoning of Pfaff
demonstrates that the Supreme Court recognizes that the value of an invention
can be appropriated even absent a physical incarnation of the invention.
Consequently, the Court may be willing to rethink Deepsouth’s rather loose
language, which is arguably dicta.
Regardless, the Federal Circuit reached the correct outcome. Allowing for
intangible infringement in the context of sales and offers to sell is consistent
with the view of such infringement effecting an appropriation of the economic
value of the invention. There need not be a physical embodiment of the
invention for harm to inure to a patentee. Indeed, the on-sale-bar standard
confirms that an invention could be “on the market” without actually being
built. Requiring a physical embodiment of the infringing good would prevent
patent holders from suing based on this harm until a good is manufactured. For

101

525 U.S. 55 (1998).
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
103 Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 58.
104 Id. at 67.
105 Id. at 60 (“The primary meaning of the word ‘invention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the
inventor’s conception rather than to a physical embodiment of that idea.”).
106 Id. at 66–67.
102
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complex inventions, like the offshore oil rig in Transocean or complex
satellites,107 waiting until manufacture may simply be too late. Moreover, it
would allow parties to game the system by completing contracts on a good that
would be infringing and by subsequently modifying the device that is actually
manufactured. Such “bait-and-switch” would harm the patentee because she
would have lost a potential sale yet would not have a cause of action. Because
the Federal Circuit has recognized that bait-and-switch scenarios can create a
cognizable harm to the patentee, infringement absent a tangible device must be
permissible to afford adequate protection to patentees against such schemes.108
2. What Is the Basis of Comparison for Infringement? The Need for an
Enablement Standard
Of course, without a physical embodiment of the device, comparing the
infringing good to the patent claim is problematic. Unspoken in the decision
but seemingly necessary for such comparison is the sufficiency of the
description of the item subject to the offer or sale. Patent law has a tool to deal
with this potential uncertainty, however: the enablement doctrine. The
traditional enablement doctrine is a disclosure obligation on the part of the
patentee: the patentee must disclose how to make and use the claimed
invention.109 But the concept of enablement—a disclosure either in a patent or
elsewhere that is sufficient to teach one of ordinary skill in the art how to make
the invention—is ubiquitous in patent law.110
Most appropriately, the courts have used an enablement-like inquiry to
determine whether an inventor has triggered the on-sale bar of § 102(b), which
precludes the patentability of an invention if the inventor places it “on sale”
more than one year prior to filing the relevant patent application.111 The
107

See, e.g., Space Sys./Loral, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 271 F.3d 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated en banc by Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
108 See Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., Inc., 514 F.3d 1262, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Although the
evidence in this case was relatively sparse, it sufficed for the jury to assume that USSC offered the VPRo I for
sale and then substituted the non-infringing VPRo II—a bait-and-switch—and to find that absent USSC’s offer
to sell the VPRo I, the sales would have gone to American Seating.”).
109 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006).
110 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 150–60 (2006) (discussing
the role of enablement in a myriad of patent law doctrines).
111 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the
Same: Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 967–74 (2000) (advocating express incorporation of enablement under § 112 into
the on-sale bar).
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Supreme Court determined that the on-sale bar can be triggered even if the
invention has not been constructed so long as “the inventor had prepared
drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific
to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the invention.”112 In this
context, a court or jury compares what was offered for sale to the patent claims
to determine whether the item for sale is the same as, or an obvious variant of,
the claimed invention. The enablement requirement provides the basis for this
comparison.
The Federal Circuit in Transocean offered no pronouncement on the
appropriate standard for assessing infringement based on what was offered or
sold in the contract. To provide a basis of comparison to the patent claim, I
suggest that the disclosures surrounding the negotiations must be enabling:
they must demonstrate to a person skilled in the art how to make the
invention.113 In assessing infringement, a court should look at the various
documents used in the negotiations as well as any design documents drafted by
the parties, regardless of whether they were subject to the negotiation. The
inquiry would go beyond traditional contract interpretation, which only
considers parole evidence if the contract document itself is ambiguous.114 This
analysis is also separate from the threshold issue of whether there has been a
commercial offer to sell the invention pursuant to contract law; instead, this
represents the infringement analysis in which the construed patent is compared
to the device accused of infringement.115 The inquiry is to determine what was
the subject of the offer to sell, and the relevant evidence can go beyond that of
the contract itself. All of this information should demonstrate that the device
could be readily assembled, pursuant to the enablement requirement, to form
an appropriate basis of comparison to the patent claim. The various documents
should contain enough information to show the presence or absence of all of
the limitations of the claim. In this way, agreements to investigate or explore a
potential research avenue or device would not be infringing: the parties to the
negotiation would not be in a position to build the device. Instead, the patentee
would have to show that the accused infringer could readily manufacture the
device from the various diagrams or other specifications. In this way, although

112

Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1998).
See Holbrook, supra note 2, at 815–20 (cataloging examples of “paper infringement”).
114 See, e.g., Thomsen v. Famous Dave’s of Am., Inc., 606 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 2010) (applying
Minnesota law); Addicks Servs., Inc. v. GGP-Bridgeland, LP, 596 F.3d 286, 294 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying
Texas law).
115 See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
113
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there can be infringement for the inchoate device, there is a proper lens to
determine whether the patent claims read on that device.
C. The One–Two Punch of Extraterritoriality and Intangibility: Criticisms
and Consequences
The Transocean decision advanced the law in two significant aspects:
clarifying the extraterritorial reach of infringing offers to sell the invention and
rejecting a requirement for a tangible embodiment of the infringing device for
offering to sell or selling the invention.
Of course, the rule in Transocean does have its benefits. It is a relatively
clear rule that affords a level of certainty and predictability: courts need not
evaluate the location of an offer, or whether there has even been an offer, if the
contemplated sale is outside of the United States. In the abstract, parties
negotiating to sell something within the United States, assuming they are
aware of U.S. patents and patent law, should know they risk infringement
liability.116
1. The Territoriality and Tangibility Holdings Permit Infringement for Acts
Entirely Removed from the United States
Nevertheless, the court’s reasoning and the impact of the rule are not
without problems.117 The court’s holding does create odd results from a
territoriality perspective. Under Transocean, two companies could enter into
negotiations in Hungary regarding a patented invention, the sale of which
would occur in the United States. Yet, as the courts have made clear, the offer
need not be accepted for there to be an infringing offer to sell.118 As a result,
116 See Cromar, supra note 4 (manuscript at 30) (justifying a “Location of the Contemplated Sale” rule
based, inter alia, on notice considerations).
117 It is not entirely clear that the court’s statutory construction is correct. The court states that the statute
defines as infringing “offers to sell . . . within the United States,” necessarily requiring the focus to be on the
location of the sale. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d
1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The entirety of § 271(a), however, suggests that, arguably, it is the offer—not the sale—that
needs to be within the United States. The “offer to sell” language was added to the string of acts that are also
infringing: making, using, and selling. As one amicus argued in petitioning the Federal Circuit for rehearing in
Transocean, parallelism in the statute suggests that “within the United States” actually modifies “offer,” not
“to sell.” See Stena Drilling Limited’s Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Defendant–Appellee’s Combined
Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 3–7, Transocean, 617 F.3d 1296 (No. 2009-1556).
Parallel structure, therefore, suggests that the term that is appropriately limited is “offer.”
118 Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010); MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials
Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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under the Transocean rule, two parties negotiating, but not reaching an
agreement, to potentially sell something in the United States could be liable for
infringement of a U.S. patent notwithstanding that no actual commercial
activity would take place within the United States.
Moreover, and rather counterintuitively, under the court’s holding, actual
contract negotiations within the United States are outside the scope of the
patent’s exclusive rights if the sale will be abroad. Thus, two parties—even
two American companies—could hold negotiations in Ohio regarding an
invention to be used in Hungary, and notwithstanding that such commercial
activity is taking place within the United States—activity that could be of
considerable value to the patent holder—these two companies would be
immune to an infringement suit. Indeed, according to the court’s holding
regarding sales, there would be no infringement for selling the invention even
if the two companies reached and signed an agreement within the United
States. The traditional view of the territorial nature of Congress’s power is that
it can regulate conduct that occurs within the United States, yet the Federal
Circuit has precluded such liability in these circumstances. It is therefore
somewhat perplexing that the upper-right quadrant of the above chart is now
clearly not an act of infringement, notwithstanding that considerable activity
takes place in the United States.
2. Unforeseen Consequences: The Potential Impact of Transocean on the
On-Sale Bar
The shift in focus to the location of the sale, as opposed to the location of
commercial negotiations, creates tension with current law dealing with the onsale bar and could greatly expand the scope of prior art that could be used to
invalidate patents. Section 102(b) of the Patent Act precludes a patent if the
invention was “on sale in this country” more than a year before the date that
the application was filed.119 Thus, just like the infringement provision, the onsale bar is territorially limited to the United States. The bar only applies if the
invention is on sale within the United States.

119 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The territorial limitations on the on-sale and public-use bars have been removed
under the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA). See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011). For extant and currently pending applications, however,
the geographic limitation will remain in force until those patents expire. Sec. 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293.

HOLBROOK GALLEYS3

2012]

8/9/2012 11:00 AM

TERRITORIALITY AND TANGIBILITY AFTER TRANSOCEAN

1113

The Federal Circuit has never squarely addressed the territorial limits of the
on-sale bar.120 At present, the only authority on this issue is the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Robbins Co. v. Lawrence Manufacturing Co.121 The Ninth Circuit
adopted the following test:
Whether or not such a sale is consummated in a foreign country,
we hold that the product is “on sale” in the United States, within the
proscription of the statute, if substantial activity prefatory to a sale
occurs in the United States. An offer for sale, made in this country, is
sufficient prefatory activity occurring here, to bring the matter within
122
the statute.

In the absence of Federal Circuit precedent, district courts have continued to
follow the Ninth Circuit’s test.123 The focus, therefore, has been on what acts
preceding the offer are within the United States, regardless of where the
contemplated sale may be.124
This approach to the on-sale bar is inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s
reasoning in Transocean. While, technically, the on-sale bar and infringement

120 See Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd., Nos. C 04-2000 CW, C 06-2929 CW, 2007
WL 3231709, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2007) (“There is little case law examining the requirement that the
offer be made in the United States.”); Holbrook, supra note 4, at 742.
121 482 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1973).
122 Id. at 434.
123 See, e.g., MDS Assocs., Ltd. P’ship v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 611, 631 (1997) (holding that “if
substantial activity prefatory to a sale occurs in the United States,” then the activity falls “within the
proscription of the statute” (quoting Robbins, 482 F.2d at 434) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Linear
Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“Sales and offers to sell to foreign
customers can invalidate a patent if the sale is made in the United States, if the offer is extended from the
United States, or if substantial sales activity prefatory to the sale occurs in the United States.” (citing Robbins,
482 F.2d at 434)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 275 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2001); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft
Braking Sys. Corp., 825 F. Supp. 65, 71–72 (D. Del. 1993) (reaching the same conclusion as MDS).
124 A recent district court decision found an offer abroad triggered the on-sale bar, given relevant activity
within the United States:

Plaintiff is correct in noting that Robbins also held that an “offer for sale, made in this country, is
sufficient prefatory activity occurring here.” However, there is no support for Plaintiff’s
contention that an offer made in the United States is necessary under Robbins.
While MPS’s actual offer to sell the MP1010 chip to Ambit took place in Taiwan, it cannot
be considered in a vacuum. The arrangements for MPS’s sales trip were made from its United
States offices, and MPS communicated from the United States with Ambit about the sale. The
products were also made in and shipped from this country. Given this additional evidence, the
fact that the offer itself was not made while the offeree and offeror were in the United States is
not dispositive. The Court finds that sufficient activity prefatory to the sale occurred in the United
States to satisfy the first prong of the Pfaff test.
See Monolithic Power Sys., 2007 WL 3231709, at *3 (citation omitted) (quoting Robbins, 482 F.2d at 434).
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for offering to sell an invention are distinct statutory provisions with different
policies underlying them,125 even the Federal Circuit has noted the parallels
between the two provisions.126 Thus, the two provisions have informed each
other in the past. Indeed, a deconstruction of the two provisions demonstrates
that, notwithstanding that the former is a prior-art provision and the latter an
infringement provision, both are concerned with the economic appropriation of
the invention. The on-sale bar deals with economic exploitation by the inventor
or others before the application is filed, and infringement by offering to sell the
invention relates to post-issuance exploitation.127
If the Transocean standard is used in the context of the on-sale bar, the
scope of potential invalidating prior art is massive. Negotiations anywhere in
the world that contemplate a sale in the United States would preclude patent
protection for an inventor, even though virtually no activity has taken place in
the United States.128 Indeed, there may not be any knowledge of the offer
within the territorial United States if the negotiations are confidential and do
not involve U.S. citizens.129 Patent applicants may not be able to obtain patents
because of remote negotiations overseas that do not transmit any information
into the United States. Given that the on-sale bar is a form of prior art, dealing
with what should be viewed as within the public domain,130 the Transocean
rule could create a broad swath of prior art that is essentially unknowable to
parties in the United States. Hence, placing the focus on the prefatory acts, as
the Robbins court has done, seems the more appropriate standard for the onsale bar.

125

See 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254–55 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In Pfaff, the
Supreme Court noted that the norms of traditional contract law should be the basis for the on-sale
determinations under § 102(b). . . . This analysis is not divergent from our § 271(a) analysis, because an offer
for sale, whether made before or after a patent is applied for, or after it is granted, requires no more than a
commercial offer for sale. Both sections invoke the traditional contractual analysis. Therefore, we similarly
define § 271(a)’s ‘offer to sell’ liability according to the norms of traditional contractual analysis.”).
127 See Holbrook, supra note 2, at 778 (“The value that the patentee extracts from the patent pre-term is
the same value that an infringer inappropriately extracts during the patent term—the commercial value of the
invention.”).
128 Under the AIA, however, the on-sale bar will no longer be limited to sales “within this country.” See
Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011). Thus, once those provisions take
effect in 2013, any offer to sell anywhere in the world, even if the contemplated sale is not in the United
States, will be invalidating. Patents filed before the effective date of the new § 102, however, will continue to
be governed by the 1952 Patent Act, which could last until 2033. See sec. 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293.
129 Whether such offers to sell will qualify as prior art under the AIA is an open question that the courts
will have to address.
130 Holbrook, supra note 2, at 781–84.
126
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If the Federal Circuit were to take such a bifurcated approach, then the
symmetry between the on-sale bar and offer-to-sell infringement would be
disrupted. Given that the two provisions essentially deal with the same
concern, such treatment would be inconsistent as a policy matter. Transocean,
therefore, could unintentionally effect a considerable expansion of the on-sale
bar by ensnaring activities conducted completely outside of the United States
that contemplate a U.S. sale. Given that none of these activities are within the
United States at all, this expansion would create uncertainty for applicants as to
whether potentially invalidating offers to sell have been made, at least by third
parties.131
IV. DOES TRANSOCEAN REALLY STAND FOR WHAT IT SAYS?
Transocean offers a striking expansion of potential infringement liability
because of its broad holdings regarding territoriality and tangibility. A closer
review of the facts, however, suggests that the expansive scope of the holdings
could be limited in future cases. Indeed, comparing Transocean with a
trademark case confronting issues of extraterritoriality, Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co.,132 exemplifies how Transocean’s holdings may be more limited than they
appear.
A. Citizenship, Effects, and Conflicts: How Bulova Could Inform the Scope of
Infringing Offers to Sell
Bulova is not a patent case—instead, it is a trademark case—but it is one of
the only cases in which the Supreme Court addressed the extraterritorial scope
of a federal intellectual property right.133 Indeed, “[o]f the major intellectual
property rights, trademark rights have long been the most susceptible to
extraterritorial application.”134 While trademarks do differ considerably from
patents in a number of ways, including the source of congressional authority
for creating the rights,135 the theories that underlie these forms of protection,136
131 If the Federal Circuit takes into account the citizenship of the party making the offer, limiting the onsale bar to offers made by U.S. citizens, then some balance may be restored. For more on this argument, see
infra note 154 and accompanying text.
132 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
133 Bulova, 344 U.S. 280.
134 Graeme W. Austin, Importing Kazaa–Exporting Grokster, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 577, 602 (2006).
135 Congress can protect trademarks under the Commerce Clause, but not under the Copyright and Patent
Clause. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). The latter authorized the patent system’s creation. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause:
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and the nature of the harm the right is intended to address,137 the reasoning of
the Supreme Court provides some useful insights into the issue of territoriality
in patent law and, in particular, the holding in Transocean.138
In Bulova, the accused trademark infringer was a U.S. citizen selling
arguably infringing counterfeit watches in Mexico.139 Although he, at one
point, had a trademark registration in Mexico for the mark “Bulova,” the
Mexican government revoked it.140 Some of the infringing watches managed to
make their way back into the United States, particularly along the Texas–
Mexico border.141 The issue was whether U.S. courts had jurisdiction to hear a
claim of trademark infringement under U.S. law when the allegedly infringing
acts took place entirely in Mexico.142 The Supreme Court held that, under these
facts, jurisdiction was appropriate.143
Subsequently, courts have identified what have come to be known as the
Bulova factors, which identify when it is appropriate to allow extraterritorial
application of U.S. trademark law: (1) whether there is a substantial effect on
U.S. commerce; (2) what the citizenship of the accused infringer is; and (3)

Are There Limits on the United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2004)
(discussing potential constitutional limits on Congress’s power under the Copyright and Patent Clause).
136 See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual
Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1380 (2000).
137 Trademarks are meant to protect against consumer confusion and dilution with respect to a symbol
used to identify the source of a good or service. See Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1033–
35 (2006). Patents provide inventors the right to exclude others from practicing their invention; the focus is on
the patent claims themselves and not on the impact on consumers in assessing liability. See Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
138 One might think that copyright would be more appropriate for comparison, given that authority for the
copyright system is found in the same constitutional provision as for the patent system and that a similar
incentive structure underlies both copyright and patent. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property,
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009) (making copyright and patent comparisons). Copyright law, though, has been
far more strictly enforced with respect to extraterritorial application. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM–Pathe
Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095–98 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Holbrook, supra note 4, at 735–38
(comparing the authorization right in copyright law to the offer-to-sell right in patent law). The courts have not
confronted a case analogous to Transocean, where there has been authorization outside of the United States for
copies to be made within the United States. Under current law, however, the authorization right in copyright is
treated as a variant of vicarious liability that differs from patent law because vicarious liability has been
codified in the separate provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and (c). See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 747.
139 344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952).
140 Id. at 285.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 281.
143 Id. at 291–92.
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whether exercising jurisdiction would create a conflict with foreign law.144
Thus, the courts have used a far more nuanced inquiry into whether it is
appropriate to apply U.S. trademark law extraterritorially than they have in
patent law.
Two of the Bulova factors are present in Transocean; the missing factor is
consideration of potential conflicts of law.145 The accused infringer was a U.S.
corporation, satisfying any consideration of citizenship. Seemingly, because
the contemplated sale would be in the United States, there would be some
impact on U.S. commerce. Thus, one could argue that Transocean’s holding
regarding extraterritoriality—that only the location of the contemplated sale is
relevant—may go beyond its facts.
The Federal Circuit itself seems cognizant of the importance of the
citizenship of the parties and of the potential effect within the United States.
The Transocean court characterized the issue as follows:
This case presents the question whether an offer which is made
in Norway by a U.S. company to a U.S. company to sell a product
within the U.S., for delivery and use within the U.S. constitutes an
offer to sell within the U.S. under § 271(a). We conclude that it
146
does.

144 E.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956). The circuit courts have
offered a variety of interpretations of Bulova, ranging from a wide-sweeping effects-based inquiry in the Ninth
Circuit, akin to the approach used in antitrust law, see Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556
F.2d 406, 427–29 (9th Cir. 1977), to the strict application of these factors as seemingly necessary prerequisites
in the Second Circuit, see Vanity Fair Mills, Inc., 234 F.2d at 642–43, to the multi-tiered approach in the First
Circuit, see McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 121 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding jurisdiction when the infringer is
a U.S. citizen, regardless of the effect on commerce, and, when the infringer is a noncitizen, there is a
substantial effect on U.S. commerce, with conflicts and comity concerns acting as mere jurisprudential
considerations). See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual Property
Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 780–82 (2009) (discussing various
formulations of trademark tests); Holbrook, supra note 69, at 2157 n.149 (discussing variations in trademark
cases). Notwithstanding this considerable variation, all of these approaches take into account citizenship and
conflicts to some extent.
145 Admittedly, Bulova dealt with a jurisdictional issue, and I propose consideration of these factors as
relevant to the substantive issue of infringement. Accord Litecubes, LLC v. N. Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d
1353, 1363–66 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting that extraterritorial issues under § 271(a) are jurisdictional and
finding instead that they are substantive). Even in trademark law, however, calling the issue “jurisdictional” is
a bit of a misnomer. See Dinwoodie, supra note 144, at 780 (“A similar conceptual structure is found in cases
involving the extraterritorial application of U.S. trademark law (often litigated as a question of subject matter
jurisdiction, but effectively assessing prescriptive authority).”).
146 617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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Later, in support of its statutory construction argument, the court noted that
limiting liability under these facts would facilitate arbitrage by parties to avoid
liability.147 An interpretation requiring that the offer itself be made in the
United States “would exalt form over substance by allowing a U.S. company to
travel abroad to make offers to sell back into the U.S. without any liability for
infringement.”148 Moreover, in one formulation of the court’s holding, the
court states:
We hold that the district court erred because a contract between two
U.S. companies for performance in the U.S. may constitute an offer
to sell within the U.S. under §271(a). The fact that the offer was
negotiated or a contract signed while the two U.S. companies were
149
abroad does not remove this case from statutory liability.

The court was therefore aware of the issues surrounding citizenship: the facts
involved two U.S. citizens, which, when compared to the facts in Bulova,
suggests that the extraterritorial enforcement of the patent may not be as
troubling.
The court’s analysis also recognizes that there should be some sort of
impact within the United States if U.S. law is to apply. In characterizing the
consequences of offers to sell in the United States, the Federal Circuit also
recognized that such offers would allow a company to “generate interest in its
product in the U.S. to the detriment of the U.S. patent owner, the type of harm
that offer to sell within the U.S. liability is meant to remedy. These acts create
a real harm in the U.S. to a U.S. patentee.”150 The court, like the Supreme
Court in Bulova, recognized that there must be some sort of impact within the
United States to justify the extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law.151
Of course, the language of the court’s holding is ultimately much broader:
“In order for an offer to sell to constitute infringement, the offer must be to sell
a patented invention within the United States. The focus should not be on the
location of the offer, but rather the location of the future sale that would occur

147

Id.
Id.
149 Id. at 1310 (emphases added).
150 Id. at 1309 (citation omitted).
151 This recognition is far short of a pure effects-based test. See generally Holbrook, supra note 69, at
2154–57 (discussing various effects-based approaches). A pure effects-based test would simply assess whether
activities outside of the United States have any impact on the United States at all. Thus, even foreign actors
could seemingly impact the United States under such a test. But see Miller, supra note 4, at 447–50
(advocating for an effects-based test for assessing infringing offers to sell).
148
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pursuant to the offer.”152 The court’s conclusion appears to be that solely the
contemplated sale’s location governs.153 The court’s reasoning, however,
suggests that the case may actually be limited to this factual situation: where
there are U.S. citizens involved and there is some harm felt in the United
States. These factual considerations track with the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Bulova and support the court’s conclusion that extraterritorial application of
U.S. patent law may be appropriate even in the face of the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Future litigants may attempt to limit the holding of
Transocean on this basis.
Moreover, consideration of the citizenship of the party making the offer
could limit the expansive impact Transocean may have on the on-sale bar. The
on-sale bar helps define the scope of the prior art in assessing the novelty and
nonobviousness of a claimed invention. The statute specifically limits on-sale
activities to those within this country.154 If, however, the overseas offer to sell
the device in the United States is made by or to a U.S. citizen, then the
knowledge has been transmitted to a third party who has a nexus to the United
States. In terms of the scope of the knowledge of the patented invention, it is in
effect within this country because it has been disclosed to a citizen of the
United States. In this fashion, citizenship could provide a straightforward
limiting principle to the potential vast reach that Transocean could create for
the on-sale bar.155
B. What’s Missing? Taking Account of Potential Conflicts of Law
The reasoning of Transocean, notwithstanding its seemingly broad holding,
generally tracks that of the Supreme Court in Bulova but with one striking
exception: the failure of the court to consider possible conflicts of law with
foreign jurisdictions. The Federal Circuit has overlooked this consideration in
other contexts as well,156 even though this concern has been articulated not
only by the Supreme Court in Bulova but also by one of the Federal Circuit’s

152

Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309.
Cf. Cromar, supra note 4 (manuscript at 28–32) (advocating a strict “Location of the Contemplated
Sale” test, regardless of nationality of the parties to the offer).
154 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
155 While my analysis focuses on the on-sale bar under the 1952 Patent Act, a citizenship-based constraint
could also apply under the AIA. In this way, notwithstanding the AIA’s elimination of the territorial limits of
the on-sale bar, a court could legitimately hold that the on-sale bar is triggered only by sales activities
involving United States citizens or corporations to provide some limits on the scope of the provision.
156 See Holbrook, supra note 69, at 2161–62.
153
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predecessor courts.157 The failure to take account of these potential conflicts is
a considerable flaw in the court’s reasoning. The courts could look to the law
of the jurisdiction where the various negotiations took place to assess whether
there is a potential conflict in holding.
An example makes the problems with the court’s conclusion clear. Suppose
that the party making the offer to sell the invention actually owns the patent in
the jurisdiction in which the negotiations take place.158 Part of the negotiations,
and the offer to sell, includes sales to the United States. In a global
marketplace, such an offer could be made in the context of negotiations dealing
with a product or products in multiple countries. Under the broad reading of
Transocean’s holding, an offer in this context would infringe a U.S. patent,
even though the offeror is negotiating in a country where he owns the patent.
Indeed, the offeror would be exposed to liability in the United States even if the
sale is never completed and even though the offeror owns the patent in the
given country.159 Patent infringement is a strict liability offense,160 so there
would be infringement even if the offeror were unaware of the U.S. patent. It is
in this way that the potential broader holding of Transocean has considerable
extraterritorial impact and risks creating conflicts with foreign jurisdictions.161
157 See Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1074 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (“Neither is there a probable
conflict with the patent laws of other count[r]ies.”).
158 This analysis will, for the time being, ignore the citizenship consideration. It is clear, though, that the
owner of the patent in the foreign jurisdiction could very well be a U.S. citizen. Under international law,
ownership and validity of patents in different countries are independent of each other. See Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4bis, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. Thus it is
possible for there to be different owners of a patent that covers the same invention around the world. See
Holbrook, supra note 69, at 2176–77. If the U.S. citizen has failed to obtain patent protection in the U.S.,
however, it suggests he may be aware of the competing U.S. patent.
Moreover, potential problems could arise on other bases, even absent some form of ownership conflict,
such as if there simply is no patent in the country of negotiations or if such a patent would not be valid in a
given country. Id. at 2172–78; Holbrook, supra note 4, at 750–58. Even the standards for infringement, such as
what constitutes an infringing offer to sell, can vary from country to country. See, e.g., MARKETA TRIMBLE,
GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT § 3.3 (2012) (discussing differences between
German and U.S. law on infringing offers to sell the invention).
159 The court’s holding with respect to an actual sale could also trigger liability for the party holding the
patent in the jurisdiction where the negotiations took place. This would be the case even if the ultimately
delivered products are different due to the intangibility portion of the Transocean decision.
160 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
161 One commentator advocates exactly for this broad interpretation of Transocean—that the location of
the sale alone determines whether there is U.S. infringement. See Cromar, supra note 4 (manuscript at 30).
Cromar argues that, “[u]nder this rule, a potential infringer would be on notice that, no matter its nationality, or
location, if it makes an offer to sell a U.S.-patented device, and the location of the contemplated sale is in the
United States, it is potentially infringing the U.S. patent.” Id. While Cromar is correct that such a rule is
certain, at least for courts, he is incorrect in suggesting that there will be notice to potential infringers. Again,
he assumes that the offeror is actually aware of the patent, which may not be the case and is not necessary for
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The failure of the Federal Circuit to account for potential conflicts is
striking, not only in the context of infringing offers to sell but in others as
well.162 Elsewhere, I have offered various mechanisms by which courts could
account for concerns with conflicts, both specifically within the context of
infringement by offering to sell the invention163 and more broadly.164
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Transocean is important. It greatly
expanded the extraterritorial reach of infringing offers to sell and the scope of
infringement by offering to sell or selling inventions that are not yet built but
instead simply designed on paper. Individually, these outcomes may not seem
striking, but together they effect a considerable change in U.S. patent law. To
cabin the scope of these provisions and the potential negative impacts on
territoriality and the scope of the on-sale bar, the Federal Circuit should either
limit the scope of Transocean to its facts, as the Bulova comparison suggests,
or take into account the other factors present in the Bulova case—effects on the
United States, the citizenship of parties involved in the transaction, and, most
importantly, potential conflicts with foreign law. In this fashion, an appropriate
balance between protecting the patent owner and respecting the territoriality
principle can be achieved.

liability to attach in a strict liability regime. Even if the offeror subsequently becomes aware of the U.S. patent
and changes the product, he seemingly is liable under the reasoning of Transocean. See 617 F.3d 1296, 1310
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Moreover, Cromar ignores the considerable conflicts problem: Why should the owner of a patent in
one country be liable to another in a different country when it is negotiating on its own patent in its own
country? Cromar also suggests that his approach is consistent with the presumption against applying U.S. law
extraterritorially. See Cromar, supra note 4 (manuscript at 32). It is not clear how that is the case. He is correct
that the presumption is consistent with the rule that sales outside of the United States are not infringing. It is
incorrect, however, to suggest that his location-only rule is consonant with the presumption. Under his rule,
liability will be triggered for activities completely outside the United States even if nothing ever occurs within
the United States (i.e., the actual sale is never completed). That is a direct extraterritorial application of U.S.
law, even more than was present in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007), in which
the Supreme Court used the presumption to narrowly interpret the infringement provisions of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f) that relate to the exportation of components that could be assembled abroad into infringing devices.
The same can be said for finding liability for sales in the United States short of actual delivery when the
agreement reached is outside of the United States.
162 See, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. (NTP II), 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Holbrook,
supra note 69, at 2160–62.
163 See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 748–59 (offering two approaches by which U.S. courts could consider
the law of the country in which a sale is completed).
164 See Holbrook, supra note 69, at 2163–85 (advocating a general theory of extraterritorial infringement).

